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ABSTRACT 
This Article will examine the reverse trend in civil commitment laws in 
the wake of recent tragedies and discuss the effect of broader civil 
commitment standards on the care and treatment of the mentally ill. The 
2007 Virginia Tech shooting, the 2011 shooting of Congresswoman 
Giffords, and the 2012 Aurora movie theatre shooting have spurred 
fierce debates about the dangerousness of mentally ill and serve as 
cautionary tale about what happens when warning signs go unnoticed 
and opportunities for early intervention missed. This piece will explore 
the misconception about the role medication and inpatient civil 
commitments should play in prevention of dangerousness and undermine 
the belief that we can medicate away the needs of the mentally ill. The 
adverse effect civil commitments can have on individuals' long-term 
recovery, future employment prospects and overall mental, physical, 
emotional and economic stability can be far-reaching; so minimum due 
process protections must be carefully guarded. The contention is that 
civil commitment decisions should be based on concrete evidence that 
the individual is an imminent danger to self or others and not on a 
psychiatrists' speculation about future deterioration absent coerced 
treatment. Statistical data, collected from a survey of 100 psychiatrists, 
will be examined to determine what is most significant to psychiatrists in 
commitment decisions and highlight the impact state standards and types 
of hospital facilities have on psychiatrists' testimony at civil commitment 
proceedings. Finally, this Article will outline how "need for treatment" 
and "grave disability" provisions in commitment standards have 
stripped away due process protections for the mentally ill and discuss 
ways mental health advocates can fight back to reverse this troubling 
movement in commitment laws . 
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INTRODUCTION 
In determining that a mentally ill person requires civil commitment 
to an inpatient psychiatric hospital, how much discretion should judges 
have? How much influence should uncontested psychiatrist expert 
opinions have on the outcome? How imminent should danger to self or 
others be? Will we permit legislatures and pro-treatment advocates to 
stretch the civil commitment standard until all due process protections 
are gone? What impact do more relaxed commitment standards have on 
the level of care that patients with mental illness receive? Why should 
disability advocates and members of the legal community alike be 
alarmed by this regressive trend toward more permissive commitment? 
There is a backlash among mental health advocates who are 
questioning the long-term efficacy of psychiatric medication for the 
treatment of persons with severe mental illness. Does a magic bullet 
really exist to treat persons with mental illness? Might there be rational 
and valid reasons for patients to refuse certain medication or treatment? 
How we as a society respond, both through treating psychiatrists who 
choose to institute commitment proceedings against patients with mental 
illness under a "grave disability" or "need for treatment" standard and 
the judges who are asked to make determinations at civil commitment 
hearings, will speak volumes about the weight we give to the liberty 
interests of individuals with mental illness. 
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In the late 1960s, there was broad consensus that the present 
treatment of persons with mental illness was inhumane and in need of 
change. There was a national push to deinstitutionalize people with 
mental illness and increase community treatment resources. State and 
federal courts, recognizing that civil commitment was a significant 
curtailment of liberty interests, I established procedural limitations to the 
previously unchallenged practice of committing mentally ill persons for 
treatment purposes under parens patriae powers.2 Following landmark 
Supreme Court decisions,3 most states adopted a stricter criterion for 
civil commitment, requmng, at a Illimmum, a showing of 
"dangerousness. "4 
Unfortunately, several decades later the pendulum has swung in the 
opposite direction. Legislatures, with the broad support of medical 
community,5 have moved to expand the definition of "dangerousness" 
back to what it was prior to the 1960s. Only eight states still define 
dangerousness solely as a "danger to self or others.,,6 Forty-two states 
have criteria broader than dangerousness that usually include either a 
"grave disability"? or "need for treatment"g provision. These expanded 
criteria give judges broad discretion to make civil commitment decisions 
I See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 
U.S. 715 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 
1 (1967); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967). 
2 R. Michael Bagby & Leslie Atkinson, The Effects of Legislative Reform on 
Civil Commitment Admission Rates: A Critical AnalysiS, 6 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 45, 
45-46 (1988). 
3 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 
563 (1975); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972). 
4 Robert A. Brooks, Psychiatrists' Opinions About Involuntary Civil 
Commitment: Results of a National Survey, 35 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 
219,219 (2007). 
5 Id. at 224. In a national survey, completed by over 700 psychiatrists, 90% of 
respondents wanted grave disability to be at least one of the grounds for civil 
commitment. Fifty-two percent supported commitment standard based on 
mental illness alone, an increase from only 10% supporting such grounds in 
1969. 
6 Improved Treatment Standards, TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR., 
http://www. treatmentadvocacycenter. orgi so I uti onli mproved-treatment -standards 
(last visited Dec. 3, 20 II). 
? Id. (stating that grave disability provision is an additional criteria adopted in 
most states that allows for commitment where a person because of their mental 
illness is unable to care for their basic needs). 
8Id. (stating that "need for treatment" provisions are a third criteria for civil 
commitment based on either the person's inability to provide for needed 
psychiatric care, inability to make an informed medical decision, or need for 
intervention to prevent further psychiatric or emotional deterioration. Currently 
twenty-six of the forty-two states with some sort of broader commitment criteria 
have "need for treatment" language in their statutes). 
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and overvalue the role of medication adherence in the treatment of 
mental illness. These provisions allow for the commitment of non-
dangerous individuals based on a presumption that, if left untreated, 
future harm will likely ensue. 
Three recent tragedies, and the public discourse that followed, may 
help to explain the reversal of long fought protections for people with 
mental illnesses. The 2007 Virginia Tech shooting, the 2011 shooting of 
Congresswoman Giffords, and the 2012 Aurora movie theatre shooting 
were three very high profile cases in which the media focused its 
discussions on the mental health of the shooters. There was a tumultuous 
debate about the dangerousness of persons with mental illness when 
warning signs go unnoticed and there is a lack of proactive intervention. 
Following these tragedies, many state legislatures have moved to loosen 
the requirements for civil commitment to make it easier to commit 
persons with mental illness who may be dangerous in the future.9 
This Article will examine the regressive trend in civil commitment 
laws and the effect of that trend on the care and treatment of persons 
with mental illness. It will take a critical look at the presumption that 
medication and inpatient hospitalization are effective means of 
preventing dangerous behavior and examine whether psychiatrists' 
predictions of future dangerousness should justify the curtailment of 
persons' liberty when there is no clear evidence that serious physical 
harm to the individual or to others is imminent. 
This Article will examine statistical data from a survey of 100 
psychiatrists in order to better understand what evidence is most 
significant to psychiatrists in commitment recommendations and 
highlight the impact of state standards and types of hospital facilities on 
psychiatrists' testimony at civil commitment proceedings. 10 
I. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS FOR PERSONS WITH 
MENTAL ILLNESS 
A. LAYING THE FRAMEWORK: SUPREME COURT OUTLINES MINIMUM DUE 
PROCESS PROTECTIONS 
Prior to the early 1970s, the civil commitment of persons with 
mental illness went largely unchallenged in the courts. State courts 
committed many people with mental illnesses under parens patriae 
9 For example, in the wake of Virginia Tech shooting, Virginia changed statute 
from requiring evidence of imminent danger to only a substantial likelihood 
person would cause physical harm to self or others. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-808, 
809 (West 20 II). 
10 See infra Appendix A: Donald H. Stone, Involuntary Commitment Survey of 
Psychiatrists (2011) [hereinafter Stone, Survey]. 
Winter 2012] Confine is Fine 327 
powers, asserting that they were in need of treatment. II The Supreme 
Court in Jackson v. Indiana extended due process protection to 
respondents in civil commitment proceedings, mandating that there be a 
reasonable relationship between the purpose of civil commitment and the 
nature and duration of commitment. 12 The Court expanded these 
protections in O'Connor v. Donaldson,13 restricting states' ability to 
confine non-dangerous individuals who are capable of surviving safely 
in freedom.14 The Court stated that the "mere presence of mental illness 
does not disqualify a person from preferring his home to the comforts of 
an institution."15 The Court held that the state's interest in providing care 
to the unfortunate was not a sufficient justification to confine a person 
with a mental illness against his will, even if it ensured him a higher 
standard of living. 16 
The Court elevated the burden of proof for civil commitments in 
Addington v. Texas, requiring the state to prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that the person is mentally ill, dangerous to either himself or 
others, and in need of confined therapy.17 The Court explained that the 
clear and convincing standard of evidence is a balance of the patient's 
interest to not be involuntarily confined and the state's parens patriae 
power to provide care for its citizens who are unable to care for 
themselves. 18 The Court weighed heavily the liberty interests of 
individuals to make independent treatment decisions and the stigma that 
can result after a person has been committed to a mental hospital.I 9 
Given the loss of liberty and the stigma of civil commitment, the Court 
stated that the factfinder should commit an individual only on "a 
showing that the individual suffers from something more serious than is 
demonstrated by idiosyncratic behavior."20 The Court chose to increase 
the burden of proof to stress to the factfinder the importance of the 
decision and to reduce the likelihood that courts would order 
inappropriate commitments.21 These landmark decisions served as 
guideposts for civil commitment laws across the country as states revised 
their statutes to comply with the Court's holdings. 
II Bagby & Atkinson, supra note 2, at 45. 
12 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972). 
13 422 U.S. 563 (1975). 
14 fd. at 576. 
15 fd. at 575. 
16 fd. 
17441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979). 
18 fd. at 426-27. 
19 Id. at 425-26. 
20 Id. at 427. 
21/d. 
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B. CHALLENGES TO STATE CIVIL COMMITMENT STANDARDS: INDIVIDUAL 
CHALLENGES MET WITH INCONSISTENT SUCCESS 
Despite the protections outlined by the Supreme Court, the 
disturbing trend seen in the "need for treatment" and "grave disability" 
statutes permits confinement based on an expectation of deterioration 
and possible future harm that is largely based on questionable 
presumptions about persons with mental illness. These exceptions to the 
requirement of dangerousness represent a complete erosion of the due 
process rights articulated by the Court.22 
There is much disagreement among state courts about what is a 
constitutionally permissible commitment standard. State courts have 
interpreted minimum due process differently. The handling of challenges 
made to "need for treatment" provisions in Alaska and Wisconsin 
reflects that variance. Despite similarities in the content of the statutes, 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the state's "need for treatment" 
provlSlon, while the Alaska Supreme Court struck down its state's 
prOVISIOn. 
The Alaska Supreme Court, in Wetherhorn v. Alaska Psychiatric 
Institute, explicitly adopted the 0 'Connor standard in holding that the 
defmition of "gravely disabled" is constitutional only if narrowly 
construed to require a level of incapacity so substantial that the 
respondent is incapable of surviving safely in freedom.23 In Alaska, a 
person was thought to be gravely disabled if, as a result of his or her 
mental illness, the person was in danger as a result of the neglect of basic 
needs or personal safety or would suffer severe or abnormal mental, 
emotional, or physical distress if not treated.24 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court went the opposite direction in In re 
Commitment of Dennis H,25 rejecting the idea that dangerousness must 
be "based upon a finding of recent overt act, attempt or threat to do 
substantial harm to oneself or another" and that there must remain an 
immediate danger at the time of the hearing.26 In Dennis H, the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of a lower 
standard for dangerousness.27 The challenged provision of Wisconsin's 
involuntary commitment statute, dubbed the "fifth standard," allows for 
the commitment of a person with mental illness who will "suffer severe 
mental, emotional, or physical harm that will result in the loss of the 
22 See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975); see also Addington, 
441 U.S.418. 
23 156 PJd 371, 377-78 (Alaska 2007). 
241d. at 376 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.915(7)(2012)). 
25 647 N.W.2d 851 (Wis. 2002). 
26 Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1093 (E.D. Wis. 1972). 
27 See Dennis H., 647 N. W.2d 851. 
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individual's ability to function independently in the community or the 
loss of cognitive or volitional control over his or her thoughts or actions" 
if left untreated.28 The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that even if there 
is no foreseeable risk of self-injury or suicide, a person is still dangerous 
if he or she is "helpless to avoid the hazards of freedom.,,29 To justify 
involuntary commitment, the level of incapacity of the gravely disabled 
person should be so substantial that the person is incapable of surviving 
safely in freedom. 30 
The addition of "need for treatment" provisions to civil commitment 
laws reflects a troubling supposition that persons with mental illness 
who are not on medication are inherently dangerous. The need for 
treatment standard upheld by the court in In re Commitment of Dennis H. 
should be unsettling to all advocates who subscribe to the belief that 
substantive due process requires a showing of dangerousness by clear 
and convincing evidence. Simply demonstrating that a person might 
benefit from involuntary civil commitment should not justify the 
deprivation of a person's freedom. New laws like those adopted and 
upheld in Wisconsin, however, do just that, redefining dangerousness to 
include "need for treatment" language. 
Despite setbacks in some courts, there have been many victories for 
disability advocates.31 The Florida Appellate Court in Boller v. State held 
that the commitment of a woman who refused to take her psychotropic 
medication was unconstitutional.32 The court followed the well-settled 
rule that refusal to take medication, despite deteriorating mental 
condition, does not justify involuntary commitment. 33 The court held that 
that there must be clear and convincing evidence that, without treatment, 
the patient would pose a real and present threat of substantial harm to 
herself or that there is a substantial likelihood that in the near future she 
will inflict serious bodily harm on herself or another, as evidenced by 
recent behavior.34 The requirement that the patient exhibit recent 
dangerous behavior rather than simply refuse to take medication 
establishes that the danger standard is fundamental and necessary to 
comply with constitutional substantive due process requirements. 
Speculation as to the significance of medication refusal should not be a 
28Id. at 857 (quoting WIS. STAT. ANN. § 51.20 (West 2011)). 
29Id. at 863 (quoting O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 574 n.9 (1975)). 
30/d. at 862--63. 
31 See State v. M.A.B., 157 P.3d 1256, 1259 (Or. Ct. App. 2007) (finding that the 
refusal to take medication was not sufficient, by itself, to prove an inability to 
provide for basic needs); see also State v. T.R.O., 145 P.3d 350, 353 (Or. Ct. 
App. 2006) (holding that a particularized threat is necessary for involuntary 
commitment). 
32 775 So. 2d 408, 409 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000). 
33Id. 
34Id. at 409-10. 
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component of the evaluation of a person's need for involuntary 
hospitalization. Recent dangerous behavior should form the basis of 
clear and convincing evidence of danger in commitment proceedings. 
In a similar case, Carolyn Blue refused to take her medication and 
faced civil commitment in Florida.35 The court reversed the involuntary 
commitment, holding that although her condition was deteriorating, the 
evidence lacked the specificity needed to establish that there was a 
substantial likelihood that in the near future she would inflict serious 
bodily harm on herself or another person.36 Mere speculation that a 
person's refusal of medication will cause her to harm others was 
insufficient to warrant involuntary commitment.37 The requirement that 
there be a substantial likelihood that in the near future the person with 
mental illness will inflict bodily harm on herself or another person is 
essential to adequately safeguard the right of patients with mental illness 
to make independent treatment decisions. 
In New Jersey, when a judge asked a psychiatrist what her basis was 
for believing that the respondent, J.R., may stop taking his medication 
and present a danger to others, the doctor could not provide any specific 
incidents of assaultive behavior that occurred while the individual was 
living without medication in the community.38 In another case, the 
Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court held that to justify 
an involuntary commitment, it is necessary to show more than a potential 
for dangerous conduct.39 The court in In re Commitment of J.R. describes 
"danger to self' by reason of mental illness as threatened or attempted 
suicide or serious bodily harm or behavior that indicates that the person 
is unable to satisfy his or her need for nourishment, essential medical 
care, or shelter to such an extent that it is probable that substantial bodily 
injury, serious physical debilitation, or death will result within the 
reasonably foreseeable future.40 The requirement of immediacy of the 
danger, coupled with the substantial risk based on recent specific acts or 
threats of dangerous behavior, should protect against medication refusal 
being used as the primary justification for involuntary commitment. 
35 See Blue v. State, 764 So. 2d 697, 698 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000). 
36 Id.; see also Lyon y. State, 724 So. 2d. 1241, 1242 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) 
(requiring the specifying of self-neglect to establish real and present threat of 
substantial harm to her well-being when patients were not on medication). 
37 See Henson Y. State, 801 So. 2d 316, 317 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). 
38 See In re Commitment of J.R., 916 A.2d 463, 465 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Diy. 
2007). 
39 In re Commitment of Raymond S., 623 A.2d 2491 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Diy. 
1993). 
40 Commitment of l.R., 916 A.2d at 467. 
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II. ROLE OF MEDICATION NONADHERENCE ON CIVIL COMMITMENT 
DECISIONS 
Should the role of government expand to authorize and sanction the 
involuntary confinement of a person with mental illness who articulates 
a refusal to comply with a psychiatrist's order of medical treatment? 
Does the rejection of a treatment plan that includes psychiatric 
medication warrant an ambulance ride to the nearest psychiatric hospital 
for evaluation and treatment? It appears that the "treatment" that many 
psychiatrists provide starts and ends with recommending that patients 
take pharmacological tablets. Whether a patient arrives at a psychiatric 
hospital with a laundry list of prescribed medications and is assessed by 
doctors as over-medicated, or he arrives in the refusal mode, without the 
list of pills, screaming "you can't make me take those pills," the 
evaluating psychiatrist's treatment plan at the admissions unit of the 
hospital remains rather consistent: Let us replace those old, less effective 
medications with some new and improved ones, or let us immediately 
start the newly-admitted patient on a drug regimen and see what 
happens. 
One should not be surprised that psychiatrists use the wait-and-see 
approach to bolster the purported need for continued hospitalization 
when the civil commitment hearing day arrives. Psychiatrists commonly 
tell judges at commitment hearings that the need to adjust medication 
type and dosage justifies continued commitment. Continued confinement 
is necessary, according to the testifying psychiatrist, to ensure the safety 
of the patient. The hospital will invariably ask the judge to sign off on 
the civil commitment order to permit the treating psychiatrist to "wait 
and see." The patient will continue to be confined against his or her will 
despite a lack of tangible evidence that the person poses a danger to 
himself or herself or others in the community. Such a decision is based 
on a misguided belief that only patients who are properly medicated are 
no longer dangerous. 
When a patient is involuntarily committed to a psychiatric hospital 
based on non-compliance with medication, the patient faces the 
possibility of being forced to take medication against his or her wil1.41 It 
is well established that a person may refuse other kinds of medical 
41 See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 1O-708(b) (West 2012) (stating that 
medication may be administered to an individual who refuses the medication, in 
an emergency, on the order of a physician where the individual presents a 
danger to the life or safety of the individual or others; or in a nonemergency, 
when the individual is hospitalized involuntarily or committed for treatment by 
order of a court and the medication is approved by a panel under the provisions 
of this section). 
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treatment even if at risk of death.42 The state's interest in protecting a 
person from harm to self is relatively low where the acts or omissions do 
not cause injury.43 Despite this recognition, there is an odd assumption 
that courts should treat forced medication for mental illness differently. 
The assumption that an untreated person's mental condition will 
decompensate without intervention until the individual eventually 
becomes dangerous is highly speculative. It is possible that the 
individual may not decompensate and will, like many individuals with 
mental illness, recover even without ongoing treatment.44 
Confinement for the purpose of providing treatment, one could 
argue, is a laudable purpose. However, if the reason for commitment is 
the refusal of a person with mental illness to comply with a medication 
regimen in the community, and confinement is for the purpose of 
treatment, ergo medication, the purpose is without meaning. Without a 
demonstration of imminent danger in the community, a person with 
mental illness could be subject to involuntary confinement simply 
because of a voluntary decision to refuse to take prescribed anti-
psychotropic medications. However, once the person is confined to a 
hospital, such medication could not be forcibly provided without a 
showing of dangerousness, and such a person could languish there 
without treatment.45 
Where proponents of involuntary commitment based on need for 
treatment maintain that coerced care is preferable to no care, the freedom 
from physical confinement by the state where an individual poses no 
danger to self or others is still the guiding constitutional principal for 
states.46 States applying a need for treatment standard do so under the 
guise that refusal of treatment will result in a person engaging in harmful 
42 See Stamford Hospital v. Vega, 674 A.2d 821, 832 (Conn. 1996) (stating that a 
patient's refusal of blood transfusions was in keeping with the deeply rooted 
common law right of bodily integrity, and the hospital's interests in preserving 
the patient's life and in protecting ethical integrity of medical profession were 
insufficient to take priority over patient's rights); see also St. Mary's Hospital v. 
Ramsey, 465 So. 2d 666, 667 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (upholding a patient's 
constitutional right of privacy, freedom to choose and a right of self-
determination in her decision to refuse a blood transfusion). 
43 See In re Duran, 769 A.2d 497,503,504 (Pa. 2001). 
44 See generally Andrew W. Kane, Essentials of Involuntary Civil Commitment 
Assessment for Mental Illness, in ESSENTIALS OF FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGICAL 
ASSESSMENT, 136, 136-64 (Marc J. Ackerman ed., 1999). 
45 See Dep't of Health & Mental Hygiene v. Kelly, 918 A.2d 470,471-72 (Md. 
2007) (holding in a forced medication case that the hospital must prove that the 
patient presents a danger in the hospital if not medicated, not just in the 
community were he to be released); see also Enis v. Dep't. of Health & Social 
Servs.,962 F. Supp. 1192, 1194 (W.D. Wis. 1996). 
46 See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563,575-76 (1975). 
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conduct or being unable to provide for his basic physical needs.47 
However, the connection between mental illness and the need for 
involuntary admission is attenuated and relies on several inferences 
about the nature of mental illness, the role of psychotropic medication in 
responding to mental illness, and the degree of dangerousness resulting 
from medication noncompliance. 
The Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration 
(SAMHSA) examines mental health treatment in the United States.48 
SAMHSA's National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH) found 
in 2008 that 58.7% of adults in the U.S. with a serious mental illness 
received treatment for a mental health problem.49 The type of mental 
health services received ranged from prescription medication (11.1%) 
and outpatient services (6.9%) to inpatient treatment (1%).50 
There are several explanations for the fact that 5.5 million adults 
with mental illness are not receiving treatment, including cost or 
insurance issues (45.1 %), not feeling a need for treatment or thinking the 
problem could be handled without treatment (40.6%), not knowing 
where to go for service (22.9%), perceived stigma associated with 
receiving treatment (22.8%), lack of time (18.1 %), belief that treatment 
would not help (10.3%), and fear of being committed or having to take 
medicine (7.2%).51 
47 See 405 ILL. COMPo STAT. § 5/1-119 (2010). The Illinois commitment statute 
states in pertinent part that a "person subject to involuntary admission on an 
inpatient basis includes a person with mental illness who: refuses treatment or is 
not adhering adequately to prescribed treatment; is unable to understand his or 
her need for treatment; and if not treated on an inpatient basis, is reasonably 
expected, after such deterioration, to meet the dangerous or gravely disabled 
criteria. Id. 
48 Use of Mental Health Services and Treatment Among Adults, NAT'L INST. OF 
MENTAL HEALTH, http://www.nimh.nih.gov/statistics/3use_mCadult.shtml (last 
visited May 27,2013). 
49Id. In 2007 there were 24.3 million adults in the U.S. with serious 
psychological distress. Results from the 2007 National Survey on Drug Use and 
Health: National Findings, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SUBSTANCE 
ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., & OFFICE OF ApPLIED STUDIES 
(Sept. 4, 2008), http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/NSDUHl2k7NSDUHl2k7 
results.cfm#Ch8. 
50 Results from the 2007 National Survey on Drug Use and Health, supra note 
49 (using 2007 data). 
51 2003 National Survey on Drug Use & Health: Results, DEP'T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., & 
OFFICE OF ApPLIED STUDIES, (June 3, 2008), http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/nhsda! 
2k3nsduhl2k3Results.htm#toc (using 2003 data). It is also noted that adults who 
used illicit drugs in the past year were more than twice as likely to have a 
serious mental illness as adults who did not use an illicit drug. Id. 
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The reasons for medication noncompliance are complicated and 
profound. Side effects of anti-psychotic and anti-depressants medications 
are often severe and significant. Anti-psychotic medications can carry 
serious side effects, including the following: myocarditis (fatal heart 
condition), changes in cardiac electrical impulses, sedation, 
agranulocytosis (decrease in white blood cells), diabetes, and serious 
weight gain.52 Other side effects include sexual dysfunction, suppression 
of REM sleep, muscle tics, fatigue, emotional blunting, and apathy.53 
Additionally, the risks and stigma associated with forced involuntary 
treatment, including feelings of alienation, disaffection, adverse impact 
on the therapeutic psychiatric-patient relationship, and loss of control 
over one's life, often undercut the recovery process.54 
A study by Bolling & Kohlenberg of 161 outpatients with major 
depressive disorder (MDD) who had completed a course of treatment 
with a selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) antidepressant found 
that one-fifth complained of "apathy," and one-fourth complained of 
"loss of creativity."55 In addition, a significant population complained of 
cognitive side effects, including "poor concentration" (17.4%), "loss of 
ambition" (16.1 %), "memory loss" (13.0%), and "problem-solving 
difficulties" (9.9%).56 
In a long-term study of persons with major depressive disorder on 
antidepressant therapies by Dr. Maurizio Fava of the Department of 
Psychiatry, Depression, Clinical and Research Program at Massachusetts 
General Hospital found that more than 30% of responders exhibit long-
term cognitive symptoms of apathy, inattentiveness, forgetfulness, word-
finding difficulty, and mental slowing, and over 40% of the responders 
experienced physical symptoms of fatigue and sleepiness/sedation. 57 Dr. 
Maurizio Fava and his colleagues concluded from this data that the long-
term symptoms of patients with major depressive disorder are both side 
52 E. FULLER TORREY, SURVIVING SCHIZOPHRENIA: A MANUAL FOR FAMILIES, 
PATIENTS, AND PROVIDERS 230-38 (2000). 
53 ROBERT WHITAKER, ANATOMY OF AN EPIDEMIC: MAGIC BULLETS, 
PSYCHIATRIC DRUGS, AND THE ASTONISHING RISE OF MENTAL ILLNESS IN 
AMERICA 170 (2010). 
54 Bruce J. Winick, Mandatory Treatment: An Examination of Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence, 75 NEW DIRECTIONS FOR MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. 27, 30 
(1997). 
55 Maurizio Fava et aI., A Cross-Sectional Study of the Prevalence of Cognitive 
and Physical Symptoms During Long-Term Antidepressant Treatment, 67 J. OF 
CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 1754 (2006). 
561d. 
571d. 
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effects of the antidepressants and the residual symptoms of the mental 
illness.58 
Persons with mental illness sometimes also refuse medication 
because they are in denial and taking medication would serve as an 
admission that they do indeed have a highly stigmatized disorder that 
can be long-lasting and disabling. 59 Resistance to medication may also 
be a battle for autonomy and contro1.60 Such individuals feel that their 
lives have been so controlled by doctors, nurses, and families and that 
controlling the intake of medications is the only power they have left.61 
Society places a stigma on mental illness and receiving medications for 
one's mental illness is an acknowledgement of the illness, which carries 
the stigma. 
Even those persons with mental illness who willingly take their 
medication may still have low levels of energy and are often plagued by 
anxieties and depression, unable to hold a job, and forced to live life in 
poverty.62 They "see no hope for love or marriage," and life may not 
appear much better when they are on medication than when they are 
Off.63 
When a person with mental illness appears before a judge to 
determine if involuntary civil commitment is necessary and appropriate, 
what is the relevance of the refusal to take psychotropic medication, 
standing alone, on the showing of danger to self or others? There is a 
preference shown toward medication compliance, whereby patients 
acknowledge their illness and recognize the benefits of medication; a 
compliant attitude equates with cooperation and adjustment. However, 
should noncompliance with medication equate with signs of danger, 
permitting a judge to authorize involuntary commitment because the 
indication is the patient lacks contact with reality, is unable to 
acknowledge their illness, is unable to seek assistance, and thus poses a 
danger to self or others? 
In his masterful book, Anatomy of an Epidemic, Robert Whitaker 
rails against the psychiatric and drug industry that has given rise to 
mental illness in America. Whitaker challenges the deep-seated belief 
that mental illness is a result of chemical imbalances in the brain and that 
psychiatric medication can improve the patients' mental health. Whitaker 
58/d. at 1757. 
59 Agnes Hatfield, Medication Non-Compliance, SCHIZOPHRENIA.COM, 
http://www.schizophrenia.comlnewsletter/997/997noncom.htm (last visited Dec. 
11,2012). 
60Id. 
611d. 
62 Jd. 
631d. 
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claims the precise causes of mental disorders are unknown.64 Whitaker 
asserts that psychiatrists embraced the chemical imbalance theory of 
mental disorders "because it 'set the stage' for them to 'become real 
doctors. '" As doctors of internal medicine had their antibiotics, "now 
psychiatrists could have their 'anti-disease' pills toO."65 
Whitaker similarly cites studies suggesting that anti-psychotic 
medication may have a negative impact on the overall course of the 
illness and might cause a worsening of the illness.66 Whitaker cites a 
number of studies that refute the notion that drugs fix chemical 
imbalances in the brain.67 Whitaker believes that psychiatry grossly 
exaggerates the value of new drugs, silences critics, and keeps the story 
of poor long-term outcomes hidden. His goal is to break up the 
psychiatry and drug company partnership that seeks to expand the 
market for psychiatric drugs.68 
There is a growing chorus of voices ringing the iatrogenic process 
bell, claiming that doctors, through their choice of medical treatment, 
inadvertently induce the disease of mental illness. Yale psychiatrist 
Thomas McGlashan wondered whether anti psychotics were making 
patients "more biologically vulnerable to psychosis" and asked whether 
the cure was worse than the disease.69 Whitaker points to a study 
demonstrating that patients with schizophrenia had long-term recovery 
rates of 40% off medication and only 28% suffered from psychotic 
symptoms. In contrast, only 5% of those taking anti-psychotic 
medication were in recovery and 64% were actively psychotic.70 Another 
alarming statistic is the skyrocketing growth in population of persons 
diagnosed with schizophrenia in psychiatric hospitals between 1955 and 
2008. The study blamed the fourfold increase on drug treatment, 
coinciding with the arrival of the medication Thorazine. 71 
Whitaker warns that antipsychotic medication may actually make 
some patients with diagnoses of schizophrenia more vulnerable to future 
relapses than would be the case in the natural course of the illness.72 
Whitaker asserts that drugs were increasing the likelihood that a person 
who suffered a psychotic break would become chronically ill.73 He goes 
on to say that initial exposure to neuroleptics puts patients on a path to 
64 WHITAKER, supra note 53, at 332. 
65Id. at 78. 
66Id. at 191. 
67/d. at 307-09. 
68 Id. at 334. 
69 Id. at 114. 
70Id. at 115-16. 
71 Id. at 120. 
72 Id. at 104. 
73Id. 
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lifelong drug dependence74 and relapse suffered by patients withdrawn 
from antipsychotics was drug-related and not the result of the return of 
the disease. 75 Swedish physician Lars Martensson agreed in 1984 at the 
World Federation of Mental Health Conference in Copenhagen, stating 
that "the use of neuroleptics is a trap ... it is like having a psychosis-
inducing agent built into the brain. "76 
Whitaker has put the spotlight on the need to reexamine the misuse 
of medication in the treatment of persons with mental illness. Advocates 
should push the dialogue to alternative forms of non-drug treatment 
options and recognize the limits of medication in the treatment of mental 
illness. States should repeal and courts should overturn the "grave 
disability" and "need of treatment" standards. Advocates should demand 
that concrete and specific evidence of current dangerous behavior be the 
only admissible evidence used to support civil commitments. Judges 
presented with persons with mental illness facing civil commitment 
should be open minded and willing to understand the reasons for 
medication noncompliance. Judges should appreciate that not all people 
with mental illness who refuse their medication lack insight into their 
illness, and that refusal to take one's medicine is not necessarily 
emblematic of a dangerous person. 
III. CHALLENGES TO PREDICTING DANGEROUSNESS: STATISTICAL 
REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF PSYCHIATRISTS' RECOMMENDATIONS IN 
CIVIL COMMITMENT DECISIONS 
When psychiatrists are called upon to offer expert testimony at civil 
commitment hearings they must explain how the patient's presenting 
behaviors support their belief that the patient poses a danger to self or 
others and requires inpatient treatment. The factors the psychiatrist 
considers in evaluating and predicting whether a person is dangerous are 
often debated and discussed; however, most scholars would agree that 
such a task is largely speculative.77 For years, the conventional wisdom 
was that clinicians were rather poor at predicting future violence in 
individuals with mental disorders. In general, studies showed that 
clinicians were right a third of the time in predicting whether an 
individual with mental illness would be involved in future violence. The 
standard conclusion was that relying on clinical experience was not 
appreciably better than flipping a coin.78 According to a clinical study on 
74 Id. at 106. 
751d. 
76 Id. at 107 (internal citation omitted). 
77 Erica Beecher-Monas, Danger at the Edge of Chaos: Predicting Violent 
Behavior in a Post Daubert World, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1845 (2003). 
78 Edward P. Mulvey, Assessing the Likelihood of Future Violence in Individuals 
with Mental Illness: Current Knowledge and Future Issues, 13 J.L. & POL'y 
629, 632 (2005). 
338 Virginia Journal o/Social Policy & the Law [Vol. 20:2 
predicting risk of physical violence of patients with psychotic symptoms, 
the most significant factor is a past history of physical aggressive 
behavior.79 Furthermore, studies indicate that clinicians vastly 
overestimate the incidence of violence in released patients.8o 
To provide empirical data on the views of psychiatrists about the 
civil commitment standard in their state and to determine how they 
evaluate different evidence in making their decisions, this author 
surveyed a diverse group of one hundred psychiatrists from twenty-six 
states.81 The respondents were from a variety of settings, public and 
private, inpatient and outpatient, rural, urban, and suburban, with forty-
three of the respondents having testified in 100 or more civil 
commitment hearings.82 Twenty-six of the respondents were from states 
with a strict dangerous criteria for civil commitment, twenty-six were 
from states with a "grave disability" provision, and forty-seven were 
from states with a "need for treatment" provision in their civil 
commitment laws.83 The empirical data84 contained in this Article is 
submitted to serve as a backdrop for purposes of illuminating and 
comparing the significance that various presenting behaviors of the 
mentally ill persons have for psychiatrists. 
The survey included a series of questions about how psychiatrists 
evaluate whether a person is a danger to self or others.85 In the first set of 
79 Mario Amore et aI., Predictors of Violent Behavior Among Acute Psychiatric 
Patients: Clinical Study, 62 PSYCHIATRY AND CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCES 247 
(2008). 
80 M. Neil Browne & Ronda R. Harrison-Spoerl, Putting Expert Testimony in Its 
Epistemological Place: What Predictions of Dangerousness in Court Can Teach 
Us, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 1119, 1174 (2008) (stating that clinicians estimated 50% 
to 80% of offenders would engage in a serious aggressive act, the actual rate of 
violence was in the 12% to 15% range). 
81 See Stone, Survey, supra note 10 (unpublished web-based survey conducted 
by the author, original survey on file with author). The survey questions and 
answer choices are reproduced infra at Appendix A. The invitations to 
participate in the survey were distributed to American psychiatric associations 
throughout the country. Survey respondents indicated they practiced in 
Alabama, Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, 
Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New 
York, Ohio, South Dakota, Texas, Utah and Wyoming. 
82Id. 
83 Id. One respondent did not complete demographic information and his 
responses are not included in data comparing responses by commitment statutes. 
84 Donald H. Stone, Results of Involuntary Commitment Survey of Psychiatrists 
(20 II) [hereinafter Stone, Results] (unpublished data on file with the author). 
The percentages cited in this Article represent the percentage of valid responses 
to each question, which exclude participants who did not respond. 
85 See Stone, Survey, supra note 10. 
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questions, there was a hypothetical about a forty-year-old-patient, 
described as carrying a diagnosis of major depressive disorder and living 
alone. The psychiatrists were told that during the past two to three weeks 
the patient presented with the following behaviors: (1) refusal to attend 
group therapy sessions; (2) vague threats to harm neighbor; (3) fired 
from job; (4) hearing voices; (5) poor sleeping habits; (6) self-injurious 
minor scratches & bruises; (7) decline in activities of daily living 
(bathing, dressing, poor hygiene); (8) eating fifty percent of meals; (9) 
left food on stove; (10) spoke of feeling sad; (11) refused to take 
psychotropic medication; (12) talked about overdosing on aspirin; and 
(13) found wandering late at night on the other side oftown.86 
The psychiatrists were asked whether they believed that the patient, 
given the evidence, was dangerous. Eighty percent of respondents found 
that under these facts there was clear and convincing evidence of 
dangerousness to warrant involuntary commitment. 87 Interestingly, a 
greater percentage of psychiatrists from states with strict dangerousness 
standard found clear and convincing evidence for civil commitment than 
the psychiatrists from states with broader standards. 88 
Hy'})olth1eticall: Clear and Convincing 
Evidence of Dangerousness 
Graph 1: Clear and Convincing Evidence of Dangerousness89 
86 !d. at Hypothetical 1. 
87 !d. at Question 3; see also Stone, Results, supra note 86. 
88 Stone, Results, supra note 86 (stating that demographic information used to 
compare responses of psychiatrists from states with dangerous standard and 
those from states with a grave disability or "need for treatment" provision). 
89Id. 
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Graph 2: Breakdown of Response by Commitment Standard90 
The respondents were asked to categorize each of the patient's 
presenting behaviors as providing (1) minimal support, (2) some support, 
(3) strong support, (4) clear and convincing evidence, or (5) being 
irrelevant to their finding of the patient's dangerousness.91 The fact that 
the patient was talking about overdosing on aspirin was the most 
significant factor to all of the psychiatrists surveyed, with 50% 
classifying the statement as clear and convincing evidence of 
dangerousness. Ninety percent said it provided strong support or clear 
and convincing evidence for their decision.92 The evidence that the 
patient had been found wandering late at night on the other side of town 
and had left food on the stove was also considered to be compelling 
evidence to over 70% of the psychiatrists.93 Hearing voices, decline in 
activities of daily living, vague threats to harm neighbor, and refusal to 
take psychotropic medication were also ranked as significant to 50% or 
more of the psychiatrists.94 
90 Id. 
91 See Stone, Survey, supra note 10, at Questions 2 and 3. 
92 Id.; see also Stone, Results, supra note 86. 
93 See Stone, Survey, supra note 10. 
94 !d. 
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Most Significant Behaviors in Psychiatrists' 
Evaluation of Dangerousness 
Graph 3: Most Significant Behaviors95 
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The value the individual psychiatrists placed on the highest ranked 
behaviors varied depending on the commitment standard of the 
psychiatrist's state of practice.96 The behaviors that were most overtly 
dangerous in nature, overdosing on aspirin and threats to harm 
neighbors, were ranked as clear and convincing evidence of 
dangerousness or strong support by a greater percentage of psychiatrists 
from states with the strict dangerous criteria than among the psychiatrists 
from states with broader commitment criteria.97 Conversely, a larger 
percentage of the psychiatrists from states with a broader criteria ranked 
those behaviors that are less explicitly dangerous, such as wandering late 
at night, leaving food on the stove, hearing voices, decline in daily living 
activities, and refusal to take psychotropic medication as significant.98 
95 See id. at Question 2; see also Stone, Results, supra note 86. 
96 See Stone, Survey, supra note 10. 
97Id. 
98Id. 
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Graph 4: Most Significant Behaviors by Commitment Standards99 
The patient's other presenting behaviors (refusal to attend group 
therapy sessions, speaking of feeling sad, and poor sleeping habits) were 
considered to provide clear and convincing evidence of dangerousness or 
strong support to less than 40% of the psychiatrists. 100 
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Graph 5: Least Significant Behaviors101 
99/d. 
100 See id. at Question 2; see also Stone, Results, supra note 86. 
101 See Stone, Survey, supra note 10. 
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Given the concerns of many psychiatrists about the danger of 
medication non-compliance, it is noteworthy that 98% of the 
psychiatrists surveyed indicated that they disagreed with the statement 
that "medication non-compliance alone satisfies clear and convincing 
evidence of dangerousness.,,102 According to the psychiatrists surveyed, 
the refusal to take psychotropic medications is not as significant to 
psychiatrists as other behaviors. lo3 They considered six factors more 
significant than medication refusa1. 104 The fact that concrete examples of 
dangerous behaviors such as wandering late at night, talking about 
overdosing on aspirin, and leaving the stove on were more significant in 
psychiatrists' recommendations should provide some comfort to mental 
health advocates. lOS 
Medication Non-Compliance Alone Satisfies 
Clear and Convincing Evidence of 
Dangerousness. 
II I agree with this 
stat<!lnl2!nt. 
I disagree with thj!: 
smt<!lnl!'llt. 
Graph 6: Medication Non-Compliancel06 
Although the data indicates that psychiatrists do not weigh 
medication non-compliance as heavily in predicting dangerousness, a 
patient's decision to forego psychotropic medications to treat his mental 
illness is still given considerable weight in the determination as to 
whether an individual is capable of living safely in the community, 
particularly where combined with a past history of dangerous behaviors 
102 See id. at Question 8 (showing medication non-compliance alone satisfies 
clear and convincing evidence of dangerousness); see also Stone, Results, supra 
note 86. 
103 See Stone, Survey, supra note 10, at Question 2; see also Stone, Results, 
supra note 86. 
104 See Stone, Survey, supra note 10. 
105Id. 
106 See id. at Question 8 (showing medication non-compliance alone satisfies 
clear and convincing evidence of dangerousness); see also Stone, Results, supra 
note 86. 
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when off of medication. 107 Fifty-one percent of the psychiatrists 
surveyed ranked the patient's refusal to take medication as either 
providing strong support or clear and convincing evidence of 
dangerousness. 108 A slightly higher margin of psychiatrists from "need 
for treatment" or "gravely disabled" states (53%) found medication non-
compliance as significant in their commitment decisions compared with 
46% of psychiatrists from states with a strict dangerous criteria. 109 
Comparison of Psychiatrists who Ranked 
Medication Non-Compliance as Clear and 
Convincing Evidence or Strong Support for 
Civil Commitment 
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Graph 7: Comparison of Medication Non-CompliancellO 
Questions 6 and 7 of the survey addressed the weight given to a 
patient's refusal of medication where there is a history of medication 
non-compliance and violent behavior. III In the second hypothetical, the 
patient did not exhibit any physically dangerous behavior but the patient 
became non-compliant with psychotropic medication and did exhibit 
dangerous behavior six months earlier. After the patient was hospitalized 
in a psychiatric facility, he resumed taking medication but went off his 
medication again two or three weeks later. 112 
A decisive maj ority of psychiatrists (79%) agreed with the statement: 
"There are no specific examples of recent dangerous behavior, it is 
premature to recommend involuntary civil commitment at this time.,,113 
An even larger majority found that there was not clear and convincing 
evidence of danger to self or others, with only 12% believing that the 
107 See Stone, Survey, supra note 10, at Question 2; see also Stone, Results, 
supra note 86. 
108 See Stone, Survey, supra note 10. 
109Id. 
110 Id.; see also Stone, Results, supra note 86. 
111 See Stone, Survey, supra note 10, at Questions 6 and 7. 
112 !d. at Hypothetical 2. 
113 See id. at Question 6; see also Stone, Results, supra note 86. 
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facts met that level of evidence of danger to self or others. 114 The 
different standards for civil commitment explain the variance. Some 
states do not require recent dangerous behavior to civilly commit 
someone. In those places, the state can use civil commitment as a 
preventive measure. 
Hypo 2: "Since There are No Specific Examples of 
Recent Dangerous Behavior,. it is Premature to 
Recommend Involuntary Civil Commitment at this 
Time." 
I agl'C0 with tbis statemenL 
with this statement. 
Graph 8: Premature to Commit Where No Recent Dangerous 
Behavior115 
Hypothetical 2: Clear and Convincing 
Evidence of Dangerousness 
Graph 9: Clear and Convincing Evidence of Daugerousness116 
114 See Stone, Survey, supra note 10, at Question 7; see also Stone, Results, 
supra note 86. 
115 See Stone, Survey, supra note 10, at Question 6; see also Stone, Results, 
supra note 86. 
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The weight psychiatrists give to medication non-compliance is 
alarmingly higher in states where the civil commitment standard is less 
than a strict dangerous criterion. 117 All but one of the psychiatrists who 
disagreed with the statement that it was premature to commit came from 
states with a need for treatment or grave disability statute.1l8 One 
respondent who supported the decision to recommend commitment in 
the second hypothetical stated that although "the patient does not exhibit 
suicidal or homicidal ideation he is clearly gravely disabled. His 
condition can only be expected to worsen if the patient is allowed to 
continue without adequate psychiatric care."119 This answer contrasts 
with responses from psychiatrists in states with the dangerous criteria. A 
psychiatrist from a state with a dangerous criteria, explaining why it was 
premature to commit, said that the patient "is at risk for becoming ill and 
dangerous, but she is not dangerous now." Another psychiatrist from a 
state with a "grave disability" provision cautioned that "psychiatrists 
cannot predict future behavior or timing [sic] when a client will 
deteriorate" but encouraged the patient to receive community treatment, 
accept in home services, and remain medication compliant to prevent 
inpatient treatment. 120 
Hypo 2: Insufficient Evidence for 
Commitment 
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116 See Stone, Survey, supra note 10, at Question 7; see also Stone, Results, 
supra note 86. 
117 See Stone, Survey, supra note 10. Eleven out of the twelve respondents who 
answered "yes" to Question 7 were from states with either a "need for 
treatment" and/or a "grave disability" provision. 
118 [d. 
119 Id. 
120 !d. 
121 See id. at Question 6; see also Stone, Results, supra note 86. 
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Graph 11: Hypo 2 Clear and Convincing Evidence of 
Dangerousness122 
However, many psychiatrists still perceive that their role is to predict 
violence and many view hospitalization as an intervention to prevent 
persons from deteriorating to the point that they might become 
dangerous to themselves or others. A psychiatrist from Missouri stated 
that as psychiatrists, "we are held by the public to a higher standard than 
law enforcement . . . . [w Je are expected to make reasonable efforts to 
foresee and prevent harm."123 Another psychiatrist remarked, "[p Jast 
evidence of dangerousness is best predictor of future harm. Success in 
prior treatment is good predictor of future success."124 One psychiatrist 
so sure of his prediction stated, "HE HAS (sic) OR IS GOING TO 
HAVE A RELAPSE."125 This belief that psychiatrists can so easily 
predict dangerousness and that forced medical treatment will prevent 
future harm is misguided and is in conflict with the reality that 
hospitalization and forced treatment are not proven to be successful at 
treating mental illness and preventing future harm. 
The most scientific predictions of dangerousness are based on 
thorough examination, diagnosis of mental symptoms, past patterns of 
behavior, and probabilistic assessments; however, these predictions are 
still wrong nearly as often as they are right. 126 Given the speculative 
nature of predicting dangerousness and the liberty interests at stake, 
122 See Stone, Survey, supra note 10, at Question 7; see also Stone, Results, 
supra note 86. 
123 See Stone, Survey, supra note 10, at Question 6; see also Stone, Results, 
supra note 86. 
124 See Stone, Survey, supra note 10. 
125Id. 
126 Charles W. Lidz et a!., The Accuracy of Predictions of Violence to Others, 
269 JAMA 1007, 1010 (1993) (recognizing that clinicians are relatively 
inaccurate at predicting future violence). 
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commitment decisions must be based on concrete evidence of recent acts 
or threats of physical violence either to self or others to decrease the 
number of false positive predictions. 
IV. DANGEROUS TRENDS IN CIVIL COMMITMENT LAWS: STATISTICAL 
ANALYSIS OF EASE OF COMMITMENT AND LENGTH OF STAY 
In addition to predictions by psychiatrists being highly speculative 
and unreliable, some experts find that the use of clinicians to predict 
violence detracts from patients care, interferes with critical decision-
making, and hampers the administration of justice. 127 In Robert A. 
Brooks' survey of 739 members of the American Psychiatric Association 
about civil commitment laws, psychiatrists acknowledged the conflict in 
the psychiatrist/patient relationship caused when psychiatrists testify in 
favor of involuntary confinement, and they indicated that legal coercion 
is inconsistent with building a positive therapeutic relationship.128 The 
therapeutic relationship between patient and treating psychiatrist is 
oftentimes jeopardized where the patient's psychiatrist is called upon to 
divulge confidential and protected communications at the civil 
commitment hearing in order to prove that the commitment criteria have 
been met. 
Is the harm to the therapeutic relationship worth the benefits of civil 
commitment? Are we better off as a society having laws that make it 
easier to confine non-dangerous persons with mentally illness? Studies 
indicate that the answer is probably "no."129 
According to the MacArthur Risk Assessment, a multidisciplinary 
study following more than a thousand individuals discharged from 
psychiatric hospitals, violent behaviors are most prevalent following 
discharge from inpatient treatment. 130 The study found that most of the 
violent behavior occurred shortly after the individuals' discharge from 
the hospital. 131 The study revealed that violent incidents dropped off 
markedly after about twenty weeks back in the community. 132 
127 Robert 1. Simon, The Myth of Imminent Violence in Psychiatry and the Law, 
75 U. CIN. L. REv. 631, 643 (2006). 
128 Robert A. Brooks, Psychiatrists' Opinions About Involuntary Civil 
Commitment: Results of a National Survey, 35 1. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 
219,225 (2007). 
129 The MacArthur Community Violence Study, MACARTHUR RESEARCH 
NETWORK ON MENTAL HEALTH, http://www.macarthur.virginia.edul 
violence.html (last updated Feb. 2001). 
130Id. 
13 1 Id. 
132 !d. 
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The length of confinement in a psychiatric inpatient facility is rather 
short, driven by insurance policies, high costs, and the belief that the 
purpose of involuntary confinement is to deal with an acute, emergency 
situation. Accordingly, the effectiveness of involuntary confinement in 
promoting the long-term wellbeing of a person with mental illness is 
questionable and the social stigma attached to being involuntarily 
committed is profound. In addition, even if a treatment team is 
successful in forcibly medicating a patient within the hospital, it is 
common to see the patient refuse to take the psychotropic medication 
upon discharge into the community. The revolving door from community 
to inpatient hospitalization and back to the community is not an efficient 
or effective method of treating persons with mental illness or preventing 
future violence. 
The push to enhance community-based mental health services is an 
important and vital step in humanely treating persons with mental 
illness. However, the trend unfortunately appears to be toward increasing 
the number of persons eligible for involuntary hospitalization despite 
evidence that frequent short-term hospitalizations cause more harm than 
good. 
A. DATA ANALYSIS OF TRENDS IN COMMITMENT LAWS AND LENGTH 
OF STAY OF CIVIL COMMITMENTS 
The Stone Survey asked psychiatrists for their opinions on the ease 
or difficulty of inpatient civil commitment in their states and if they have 
seen a change in the past five years. The majority of the psychiatrists 
(51 %) indicated that commitment laws in their states were about the 
same, 26% indicated that it had become more difficult, and 23% said that 
it had become easier to commit. 133 Interestingly, a greater percentage of 
psychiatrists from states with strict dangerousness criteria found that it 
had gotten easier to commit individuals than those from states with 
broader criteria. 134 
133 Stone, Results, supra note 86; see Stone, Survey, supra note 10. 
134 See Stone, Survey, supra note 10; Stone, Results, supra note 86 (stating that 
29% of psychiatrists in states with strict dangerous criteria and 21 % of 
psychiatrists from states with broader criteria indicated that it is easier to 
commit people to hospitals than five years before). 
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Graph 13: Breakdown of Ease of Commitment by Standard136 
In addition, a greater proportion of psychiatrists who work primarily 
in inpatient facilities found that it had gotten easier to commit than those 
135 Stone, Results, supra note 86; see Stone, Survey, supra note 10, at 
Question 9. 
136 Stone, Results, supra note 86; see Stone, Survey, supra note 10, at 
Question 9. 
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who do not work in such facilities.137 Interestingly, many psychiatrists 
expressed that the changes in the ease or difficulty of committing a 
person were largely based on outside factors such as the shortages of 
beds making it more difficult to commit. 138 Some expressed that the ease 
of commitment largely depended upon the jurisdiction and the judges in 
the area, with some judges more strict about the criteria and others more 
libera1. 139 Some psychiatrists expressed frustration with commitment 
laws, lawyers, and judges that they felt sometimes obstructed patients' 
ability to obtain needed treatment, blaming the strict dangerous criteria 
and "limiting emphasis on the deteriorating mental health condition of 
patients" for causing "an undue burden on the mental health professional 
in providing the best and appropriate care.,,140 
Ease of Civil Comm.itment 
(Inpatient vs. Outpatient) 
30% i----"----~ 
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1D% 
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iiltillpatient 
II[ 0 utpatient 
The average length of stay at a nonfederal short-stay hospital for 
psychoses in 2009 was 7.5 days overall and 11.2 days for 
137 Stone, Results, supra note 86 (giving the demographic information used to 
compare responses of psychiatrists who indicated they worked predominately in 
an inpatient or outpatient setting, 22% of respondents from inpatient (n=2l) 
facilities and 14% of respondents from outpatient facilities (n=59) indicated that 
it is easier to commit people to hospitals than five years before. Data from 
persons that worked at both equally or left demographic question blank not 
included in this data). 
138 !d.; see Stone, Survey, supra note 10, at Question 9. 
139 See Stone, Survey, supra note 10. 
140Id. 
141Id. 
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schizophrenia.142 This marks a decrease in the length of stay from 12.2 
days in 1990.143 In a study of the average length of inpatient stays for 
schizophrenia, depression, and bipolar disorder between 1996 and 2000 
in Pennsylvania,144 the length of stay decreased for all three conditions 
between 1996 and 2000 dropping from 11.3 days to 7.6 days for 
depression, 19.0 to 12.7 days for schizophrenia, and 13.9 to 9.4 days for 
bipolar disorder. 145 This study found that patients with public insurance 
(Medicaid or Medicare) had the longest length of stay and individuals 
with HMOs had the shortest. 146 
In the Stone Survey, 45% of the psychiatrists indicated that the 
length of stay for inpatient treatment is too short, and only 16% believed 
that the length of stay is too 10ng.147 Interestingly, there was a significant 
split in opinion about the appropriateness of the average length of stay 
between outpatient and inpatient psychiatrists. Not one inpatient 
psychiatrist believed that the average length of inpatient treatment is too 
long, but 20% of psychiatrists who work at outpatient facilities believed 
that to be the case. 148 Most outpatient psychiatrists found that treatment 
stays in inpatient facilities were too short, explaining that there were not 
enough resources in the community to meet the acute needs of some of 
their patients. Many psychiatrists attributed the short stays to fiscal 
pressures, blaming insurance companies and bed shortages. 149 
142 NAT'L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, NATIONAL HOSPITAL DISCHARGE 
SURVEY: AVERAGE LENGTH OF STAY AND DAYS OF CARE - NUMBER AND RATE 
OF DISCHARGES BY FIRST-LISTED DIAGNOSTIC CATEGORIES (2009). 
143 HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT. ASS'N, DGA ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL 
HOSPITAL DISCHARGE SURVEY, 1990-2002 (2005). 
144 Jeffrey S. Harman et aI., Profiling Hospitals for Length of Stay for Treatment 
of Psychiatric Disorders, 31 1. BEHAV. HEALTH SERVS. & RES. 66, 70 (2004). 
145 Id. 
146 !d. 
147 See Stone, Survey, supra note lO, at Question 10; see also Stone, Results, 
supra note 86. 
148 See Stone, Survey, supra note 10; see also Stone, Results, supra note 86. 
149 See Stone, Survey, supra note lO, at Question lO; see also Stone, Results, 
supra note 86. 
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There was also a significant difference in responses between people 
who work in public hospitals versus private hospitals, with more 
150 See Stone, Survey, supra note 10, 
151 See id.; see also Stone, Results, supra note 86. 
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psychiatrists in public hospitals finding the length of stay to be too 
long. 152 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Given the liberty interests at stake in civil commitment decisions, it 
is imperative that both the commitment laws and actions taken by people 
involved in the commitment process ensure the due process rights of 
mentally ill persons are respected. For those individuals who have a 
mental illness and are in need of treatment, the challenge is to provide 
the needed care and treatment in the least restrictive setting appropriate 
to meet their needs. The individual's right to be treated in a humane 
setting with due process protections should be balanced against the 
safety interests of the community. 
The following are recommendations to guide state legislatures in 
developing and implementing an involuntary civil commitment statute: 
1. Require a demonstration of imminent danger of physical 
harm to the life ofthe individual or others. 
2. Require that imminent danger can only be found where clear 
and convincing evidence at the time of the hearing shows 
152 See Stone, Survey, supra note 10, at Question 10; see also Stone, Results, 
supra note 86 (giving the demographic information used to compare responses 
of psychiatrists who indicated they worked primarily in private or public 
settings; 20 respondents were from private settings, 75 were from public 
settings, and 5 were other and not included in the data reported for purposes of 
this question). 
153 See Stone, Survey, supra note 10. 
Winter 2012] Confine is Fine 355 
that there is an imminent risk of serious physical harm to the 
individual or others. 
3. Clear and convincing evidence of dangerousness can only be 
concrete evidence of recent actions or threats of physical 
harm to self or others. Evidence of recent acts or threats of 
emotional harm should not satisfy this requirement. 
4. Individuals who are deteriorating but have not yet reached 
the level of causing serious physical harm shall not be 
subjected to involuntary civil commitment. 
5. Establish a policy that inpatient civil commitment should 
only be used to deal with persons with mental illness who 
are acutely dangerous at the time of the commitment. The 
purpose of the commitment should only be to stabilize 
patient and return him to the community. 
6. Establish as a policy that the lack of medication in and of 
itself should never warrant civil commitment without a 
showing of clear and convincing evidence of dangerousness. 
7. Expand funding for outpatient mental health treatment 
servIces. 
CONCLUSION 
There continues to be pressure on psychiatrists to err on the side of 
caution when it comes to recommending inpatient hospitalization. 
However, it is shortsighted to believe inpatient hospitalization is a magic 
bullet to protect the public from persons with mental illness who are 
deemed dangerous. The mistaken belief that medication noncompliance 
is an accurate predictor of future dangerous behavior is impeding a long-
term solution to addressing the needs of the growing population with 
acute mental illness. The watered down "grave disability" or "need for 
treatment" standards make it easier to commit individuals but do not 
address the long-term care needs of persons with mental illness. 
There must be a collaborative approach to fixing the civil 
commitment laws and addressing the mental health needs of persons 
with acute mental illness. We should all take a collective deep breath and 
review the goals of involuntary civil commitment, balancing the need to 
protect the individual and community from serious harm and the civil 
liberty interests at stake in confining a mentally ill person against his 
will. Community-based treatment programs need to be supported and 
more fully appreciated. A return to a strict "dangerous" standard, 
requiring a showing of imminent danger to self or others, and a focus on 
improving the community based mental health services are essential to 
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alleviating the shortages of inpatient hospital beds needed to 
appropriately treat the population of persons with mental illness who are 
considered dangerous. Finally, judges must base their civil commitment 
decisions on concrete evidence of dangerous behavior and stop relying 
on the psychiatrist's crystal ball prognosis of future deterioration. 
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ApPENDIX A: STONE SURVEY 
Question 1. Please fill-in the following demographic information: 
What is your job title? __________________ _ 
In what state do you practice? ________________ _ 
How would you classifY the area where you practice (rural, suburban 
urban)? _________________________ ___ 
How many years have you been a psychiatrist? 
What type of facility do you practice (public or private)? 
What type of patients do you primarily come in contact with (mostly 
inpatient, mostly outpatient, both equally)? 
How many involuntary commitments have you provided testimony or 
evidencein? ______________________ ___ 
Survey Instructions 
Please read Hypothetical 1 and 2. Answer each question based on 
your state's standard for in-patient civil commitment of a person with a 
mental illness. 
In answering the questions below, assume that the patient is Pat 
Brown, a 40-year-old patient who carries a diagnosis of major depressive 
disorder, lives alone, and you are not currently treating the patient but 
are asked to make a recommendation on whether Pat should be 
involuntarily committed to an in-patient facility. 
Some of the questions in the survey will ask you about the weight 
you would give to different factors in deciding whether or not civil 
commitment is appropriate. I understand that in practice, your decision is 
based on a combination of factors whereby the totality of all factors 
determines the outcome. However, for purpose of this survey, I am 
attempting to determine the weight you would give to each individual 
factor in your decision. 
Hypothetical 1 
During the past two to three weeks Pat Brown presented with the 
following behaviors. Pat has eaten fifty percent of meals, left food on the 
stove on three occasions resulting in smoke filling the apartment, has 
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spoken with neighbors about feeling sad and is talking about taking an 
overdose of over the counter aspirin. Pat's activities of daily living have 
declined over the past two to three weeks, refusing to bathe, dress and 
exhibiting poor hygiene. Again, the past two to three weeks, Pat was 
exhibiting poor sleeping habits and found wandering late at night on the 
other side of town, confused, without a reasonable explanation for being 
there. Over the past two to three weeks, Pat has refused to take 
prescribed psychotropic medication for the diagnosed mental disorder 
and has refused to attend recommended group sessions at a local mental 
health clinic. 
Additionally, Pat has made a few vague threats to harm the next-
door neighbor, complaining about loud music. Pat has self-injurious 
minor scratches and bruises, and acknowledges hearing voices. In the 
past two to three weeks, Pat was recently fired from for excessive 
lateness and was referred to you for a consult to determine the 
appropriateness of in-patient psychiatric treatment. 
Question 2. Please classify the strength you would give to each of the 
following factors in deciding whether or not to recommend the 
involuntary commitment of Pat to an in-patient hospital or treatment 
facility. 
Clear and Strong Some Minimal Not 
Convincing Support Support Support Relevant 
Decline in 
activities of 
daily living 
(bathing, 
dressing, poor 
hygiene) 
Eating 50% of 
meals 
Refusal to 
take 
psychotropic 
medication 
Spoke of 
feeling sad 
Talking about 
overdosing on 
.. 
aspmn 
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Fired from job 
Self-injurious 
mmor 
scratches & 
bruises 
Poor sleeping 
habits 
Hearing 
VOices 
Found 
wandering late 
at night on the 
other side of 
town 
Refusal to 
attend group 
therapy 
seSSIOns 
Vague threats 
to harm 
neighbor 
Left food on 
stove 
Question 3. If you were asked to testify in the in-patient civil 
commitment hearing of Pat Brown, would you find that there is clear and 
convincing evidence of dangerousness to warrant involuntary 
commitment? 
__ Yes, there is clear and convincing evidence of dangerousness. 
__ No, there is not clear and convincing evidence of dangerousness. 
Please explain. 
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Question 4. If you answered yes to question three, please indicate which 
evidence you gave the greatest weight and which the least? 
Most Relevant 
__ Decline in activities of daily 
living (bathing, dressing, poor 
hygiene) 
__ Eating 50% of meals 
Least Relevant 
__ Decline in activities of daily 
living (bathing, dressing, poor 
hygiene) 
__ Eating 50% of meals 
__ Refusal to take psychotropic __ Refusal to take psychotropic 
medication medication 
__ Spoke of feeling sad 
__ Talking about overdosing on 
aspmn 
__ Fired from job 
__ Self-injurious minor 
scratches & bruises 
__ Poor sleeping habits 
__ Hearing voices 
__ Found wandering late at 
night on the other side of town 
__ Refusal to attend group 
therapy sessions 
__ Vague threats to harm 
neighbor 
Left food on stove 
Please explain. 
__ Spoke of feeling sad 
__ Talking about overdosing 
onaspmn 
__ Fired from job 
__ Self-injurious minor 
scratches & bruises 
__ Poor sleeping habits 
__ Hearing voices 
__ Found wandering late at 
night on the other side of town 
__ Refusal to attend group 
therapy sessions 
__ Vague threats to harm 
neighbor 
Left food on stove 
Winter 2012] Confine is Fine 361 
Question 5. Based on the hypothetical, do you think there are less 
restrictive treatment options available that are consistent with the welfare 
and safety of Pat? 
Yes. 
No. 
Please explain. 
Hypothetical 2 
Six months ago Pat became non-compliant with psychotropic 
medication, exhibited dangerous behavior, was hospitalized in a 
psychiatric facility and upon discharge resumed taking medication. 
About 2-3 weeks ago Pat again went off the medication and was brought 
before you for an evaluation to determine if Pat should be involuntarily 
committed in a psychiatric hospital for care or treatment. At the point of 
your evaluation, there are no specific examples of dangerous behavior 
being exhibited, however the concern is Pat is again off the psychotropic 
medication. 
Question 6. Since there are no specific examples of recent dangerous 
behavior, it is premature to recommend involuntary civil commitment at 
this time. 
__ I agree with this statement. 
__ I disagree with this statement. 
Please explain. 
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Question 7. Based on the facts in hypothetical 2, would you find that 
there is clear and convincing evidence of danger to self or others 
necessary for the involuntary in-patient commitment of Pat Brown? 
Yes. 
No. 
Please explain. 
General Questions 
Please answer the following questions based on your perception of 
the current involuntary commitment laws and practices in your state. 
Question 8. Medication non-compliance alone satisfies clear and 
convincing evidence of dangerousness. 
__ I agree with this statement. 
__ I disagree with this statement. 
Please explain. 
Question 9. Over the past 5 years, what is your understanding about the 
"ease or difficulty" of involuntarily committing a mentally ill person to 
an in-patient psychiatric hospital for care or treatment? 
__ Easy to involuntarily commit. 
__ Difficult to involuntarily commit. 
About the same. 
Please explain. 
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Question 10. Over the past 5 years, what is your understanding about 
the "length of stay" of those individuals involuntarily confined to an in-
patient psychiatric hospital for care or treatment? 
__ Just right. 
__ Too long. 
Too short. 
Please explain. 
